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Autonomy and the Limits of Cognitive Enhancement 
 
Abstract 
In the debates regarding the ethics of human enhancement, proponents have found it difficult 
to refute the concern, voiced by certain bioconservatives, that cognitive enhancement violates 
the autonomy of the enhanced. However, G. Owen Schaefer, Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu 
have attempted not only to avoid autonomy-based bioconservative objections, but to argue that 
cognition-enhancing biomedical interventions can actually enhance autonomy. In response, 
this paper has two aims: firstly, to explore the limits of their argument; secondly, and more 
importantly, to develop a more complete understanding of autonomy and its relation to 
cognitive enhancement. By drawing a distinction between the capacity for autonomy and the 
exercise and achievement of autonomy and by exploring the possible effects of cognitive 
enhancement on both competence and authenticity conditions for autonomy, the paper 
identifies and explains which dimensions of autonomy can and cannot, in principle, be 
enhanced via direct cognitive interventions. This allows us to draw conclusions regarding the 
limits of cognitive enhancement as a means for enhancing autonomy. 
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Introduction 
 
According to G. Owen Schaefer, Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu, when cognitive and 
volitional limitations prevent healthy, cognitively-unimpaired individuals from living – what 
Savulescu has referred to as – ‘the best life’,1 the solution is not paternalistic intervention.2 
Instead, cosmetic neurological help should be provided to enhance core cognitive capacities; 
for example, by way of nootropic drugs, surgery, neural implants, direct brain-computer 
interfaces or genetic engineering. The presumption here is not that there is a threshold of 
cognitive ability such that only those individuals that fall short stand to benefit from cognitive 
enhancement (‘CE’). Rather, those that advocate for direct manipulations of brain structure via 
biomedical and technological means tend to appeal to a perfectionist view of cognitive 
function. Accordingly, we are all in a position to benefit from the amplification of our cognitive 
capacities.3  
The problem is that although there has been strong support for CE via indirect 
interventions such as psychotherapy and education, some bioconservatives have objected to 
more unconventional approaches because they violate autonomy.4 According to Jürgen 
Habermas’ critique of enhancement, with which Schaefer et al. explicitly engage, although ‘we 
should come to the aid of others, and do all we can to improve the conditions of their lives’, 
‘we are not permitted to determine, according to our own ideas about other people’s future life, 
the range of opportunities these others will one day face in their attempt to give ethical shape 
to their own lives’.5 Focusing on genetic enhancement, he raises the concern that eugenic 
 
1 Savulescu, J. (2001). Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children. Bioethics. 15(5-6): 
413-26. 
2 Schaefer, G.O., Kahane, G., & Savulescu, J. (2014). Autonomy and Enhancement. Neuroethics. 7: 123-36, at 
130. 
3 The authors claim that their argument can also account for positions that assume a threshold of cognitive ability. 
4 Those wary of cognitive enhancement are also concerned with issues concerning safety, fairness, unnaturalness 
and social pressure.  
5 Habermas, J. (2003). The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge: Polity Press: pp. 89-90. 
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programming of desirable traits ‘commits the person concerned to a specific life-project or, in 
any case, puts specific restrictions on his freedom to choose a life of his own’.6 In effect, by 
subjecting the genetically-enhanced individual to third-party prenatal design intentions, he is 
no longer ‘the undivided author of his own life’.7 What has occurred is the ‘alienating dilution 
or fracturing’ of the child’s identity to the degree that he is not able to authentically exercise 
his autonomy.8 In response, Schaefer, Kahane and Savulescu argue that if it can be shown that 
controversial direct modalities for amplifying cognition do, in fact, enhance autonomy, then 
bioconservatives would no longer have an autonomy-based reason to oppose them.9 
Schaefer et al. acknowledge that if they are to present an autonomy-based case for CE, 
then they need to make the nature of autonomy explicit. However, they recognise the difficulty 
of presenting an account of autonomy enhancement that satisfies the competing conditions of 
different theories of autonomy.10 Their solution involves identifying ‘features common to all 
(or at least most) plausible conceptions of autonomy’.11 They claim that ‘most will accept that 
reasoning capacity is necessary for autonomy’, whereby such a capacity is understood in terms 
of the cognitive capacities for ‘deductive/logical competence, comprehension (including the 
avoidance of false beliefs), and critical analysis’.12 They argue that if reasoning capacity is a 
necessary condition of autonomy, then inhibiting this capacity via ‘brainwashing, 
psychological manipulation, deception, and lack of self-awareness’ will generally inhibit 
autonomy.13 Improving reasoning capacity will, therefore, generally prevent these 
impediments. They claim that CE will improve reasoning capacity. Consequently, CE will 
generally improve autonomy.  
 
6 Habermas op. cit. note 5, p. 61.  
7 Ibid: 63. 
8 Ibid: 82. 
9 Schaefer et al. op. cit. note 2, p. 135.  
10 Ibid: 126. 
11 Ibid: 125. 
12 Ibid: 126-7. 
13 Ibid: 127.  
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The fundamental aim of this paper is to explore the limits of this argument and, more 
importantly, to develop a more complete understanding of autonomy and its relation to 
enhancement. The paper begins by situating Schaefer et al.’s approach to ‘features common to 
all (or at least most) plausible conceptions of autonomy’ in relation to the capacity-oriented 
competence model of autonomy traditionally employed in the context of patient consent (§1). 
It will be shown that there is a distinction to be made between autonomy understood in terms 
of the capacities for autonomous agency, that is, the capacity for autonomy, and autonomy 
understood as an individual’s autonomous exercise of these capacities, that is, the exercise and 
achievement of autonomy (§2). The issue is that Habermas’ bioconservative concerns, which 
are also reflected in the contemporary empirical literature on enhancement, lead him to extend 
the discussion of autonomy beyond competency, encompassing matters relating to the authentic 
exercise of one’s autonomy through those reasoning processes that give rise to one’s behaviour. 
Although the point of this paper is not to argue for or against the reasonableness of Habermas’ 
critique of enhancement, questions of authenticity are vital to determining the autonomy-
enhancing limits of CE. In order to explain those limits, the final section (§3) will engage with 
relational conceptions of autonomy, for which authenticity conditions are as important to the 
capacity for, and exercise of, autonomy as competency conditions. I argue that although 
reasoning capacity is a necessary condition for the exercise and achievement of autonomy, we 
need a more complete understanding of autonomy, one that considers the relationships between 
competence, authenticity and enhancement, in order to successfully determine whether CE 
generally improves autonomy. In light of relational conceptions of autonomy, this paper shows 
that CE is not a sufficient condition for autonomy enhancement. Furthermore, there is evidence 
to suggest that it may not even be a necessary condition for the enhancement of an agent’s 
exercise of her autonomy. By explaining the limits of CE as a means for autonomy 
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enhancement, this paper complements Schaefer et al.’s approach, yet, simultaneously, extends 
the debates regarding the ethics of bioenhancement.  
 
1. Competency and the Capacity for Autonomy  
 
Philosophical accounts of the nature of autonomy tend to focus on different specifications of 
two broad categories of conditions; competency and authenticity. In medical decision-making 
contexts, it is accepted that a competent person must have the capacities to comprehend 
information, critically reflect on and revise beliefs and make a decision in the light of 
information. Similarly, for Schaefer et al., competency conditions refer to ‘reasoning capacity’, 
that is, the cognitive capacities needed for an individual ‘to properly comprehend the options 
ahead of them, evaluate different options, deduce appropriate courses of action, weigh 
consequences, etc.’14 These are the capacities for ‘deductive/logical competence, 
comprehension (including the avoidance of false beliefs), and critical analysis’, which, 
according to Schaefer et al., are taken to be ‘generally-accepted constituents of autonomy, such 
that improving on those features is generally taken to improve people’s autonomy’.15 Such an 
approach is an important premise in Savulescu’s work on addiction and autonomy.16 
Specifically, he adopts the competence model of autonomy, which is constituted solely by 
competency conditions, namely, the capacities to comprehend, retain, reflect on and rationally 
manipulate information and communicate a choice. In philosophical terms, this is an account 
of the necessary conditions for autonomous agency understood as the capacity for autonomy.17 
Consequently, there is no explicit mention of authenticity, which, according to Schaefer et al., 
 
14 Schaefer et al. op. cit. note 2, p. 126. 
15 Ibid: 126-7 
16 Foddy, B., & Savulescu, J. (2006). Addiction and Autonomy: Can Addicted People Consent to the Prescription 
of their Drug of Addiction? Bioethics. 20(1): 1-15. 
17 Holroyd, J. (2009). Relational Autonomy and Paternalistic Interventions. Res Publica. 15: 325. 
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‘is a notoriously vague and underspecified notion, making the task of elucidating how 
autonomy might be enhanced quite difficult’.18 Furthermore, the capacity-oriented conception 
of autonomy has been viewed as the basis for the functional-augmentative approach to 
enhancement whereby, according to its proponents, enhancements in general are considered to 
be interventions that ‘improve some capacity or function (such as cognition, vision, hearing, 
alertness) by increasing the ability of the function to do what it normally does’.19 
The concept of the competent agent has been a core feature of those debates in bioethics 
and medical ethics in which Schaefer, Kahane and Savulescu are immersed. It not only grounds 
traditional approaches to the principle of respect for patient autonomy in medical ethics and 
law, but, for the past two decades, and in conjunction with liberal principles, has set the 
regulatory and statutory parameters within which patients should be immune from paternalistic 
clinical interventions.20 For example, if we follow sections 2(1) and 3(1) of the UK’s Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, then, in order to consent to treatment, an adult patient is presumed to have 
the capacities to understand, retain, use and weigh up the information relevant to a decision 
and communicate the decision. The implication is that when a patient lacks deliberative 
competence capacities (at the time when a decision needs to be made), outside interference in 
the decision-making process is more likely to be justified. However, as John Coggon and José 
Miola have observed, the problem is that ‘a bald reading of the statutory test for capacity 
suggests only that a patient need have the capacity to understand’.21 In light of developments 
in common law, ‘a doctor cannot simply accept an apparent consent from a patient who has the 
capacity for understanding, if that consent is based on the patient’s having made the decision 
 
18 Schaefer et al. op. cit. note 2, p. 125. 
19 Earp, B.D., Sandberg, A., Kahane, G., & Savulescu, J. (2014). When is Diminishment a Form of Enhancement? 
Rethinking the Enhancement Debate in Biomedical Ethics. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience. 8(12): 2. 
20 For example, Dworkin, G. (1988). The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
21 Coggon, J., & Miola, J. (2011). Autonomy, Liberty, and Medical Decision-making. Cambridge Law Journal. 
70(3): 541. 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in ignorance of important factors that would bear on the decision’.22 Consequently, the 
assumption is that if a doctor lists the risks inherent in a procedure and then allows the 
competent patient to make her own choice based on that information, her choice is rendered 
autonomous. Nevertheless, while disclosure of relevant information is part of facilitating 
autonomy, it is not in itself enough to ensure that the patient makes an autonomous choice. As 
Jules Holroyd observes, an agent’s choice is autonomous when she exercises her competence 
capacities in deciding what to do on some occasion, which may demand the satisfaction of 
additional conditions, such as those pertaining to the accuracy of her beliefs or the 
reasonableness of her deliberation.23 Consequently, the combination of common law, statutory 
duties and established medical jurisprudence amount to some level of obligation to ensure that 
a patient’s competence capacities are genuinely exercised in accordance with certain epistemic 
standards. As Coggon and Miola observe, ‘there is a concern not just for the capacity for reason, 
but also for the effective use of it’.24  
Schaefer et al. recognise that additional conditions need to be satisfied in order to render 
an agent’s choice autonomous. Accordingly, they stress the importance of an agent to be able 
to reason ‘rationally’, ‘properly’ and ‘soundly’.25 Insofar as ‘they work by affecting 
individuals’ internal psychology and ability to reason properly’, Schaefer et al. consider cases 
of brainwashing, psychological manipulation and deception to be indicative of autonomy 
inhibition.26 Furthermore, they claim that when it comes to making autonomous choices, 
‘accuracy of beliefs’ is particularly important in the sense that an agent has ‘true beliefs’ and 
‘correct comprehension of the world and themselves’.27 On the basis that ‘autonomy involves 
choice between options for what one judges one ought to do’, Schaefer et al. implicitly account 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 Holroyd op. cit. note 17, pp. 325-6.  
24 Coggon & Miola op. cit. note 21, p. 528.   
25 Schaefer et al. op. cit. note 2, p. 127.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid: 129. 
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for the relationship between autonomous agency and autonomous choice by incorporating both 
within the capacity for autonomy (thereby appealing to the functional-augmentative approach 
to enhancement). In other words, rather than attend to competency and authenticity conditions 
for the genuine exercise of an agent’s capacity for autonomy when making a choice, Schaefer 
et al. put forward a rationalistic argument for CE whereby autonomous choice can be explained 
by appealing to ‘reasoning capacity’. In short, improving an agent’s cognitive capacities for 
autonomous agency will not only improve their ability to comprehend, retain, reflect on and 
rationally manipulate information, but improve their capacity to reason ‘rationally’, ‘properly’ 
and ‘soundly’ thereby safeguarding the agent from paradigmatic cases of autonomy inhibition 
and rendering their choices autonomous.  
 
2. Autonomy Distinctions in the Light of Bioconservative Concerns 
 
This brings us to another important distinction in discussions regarding autonomy: autonomous 
action,28 which, for reasons that will become clearer, I call the ‘exercise and achievement of 
autonomy’. It concerns the individual’s power to determine how she exercises her authority 
over her actions. In other words, an action that is directed at some goal is more or less 
autonomous depending on the degree to which one is the ‘power behind whatever reasoning 
directly gives rise to one’s behaviour’.29 Although there is philosophical disagreement about 
what exactly constitutes this power, the point is that an agent’s values and desires, which 
motivate her behaviour, can be more or less autonomous depending on whether the processes 
or volitional structures by which they come to be developed are truly her own. Here, 
competence considerations overlap with those more explicitly aligned with authenticity. In 
 
28 Holroyd op. cit. note 17, p. 326. 
29 Buss, S., & Westlund, A. (2018). Personal Autonomy. In E.N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/personal-autonomy/. 
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short, although the capacity for autonomy and the competency conditions that constitute that 
capacity are necessary for an agent’s ability to govern her actions, they do not guarantee that 
she can authentically determine how she exercises her autonomy.30 
 In light of Schaefer et al.’s claim that CE will generally improve autonomy, we need to 
specify whether this means improving both the capacity for autonomy and exercises of 
autonomy. In the literature on moral enhancement, the same distinction has been made, 
specifically, between behaviour-oriented and capacity-oriented enhancement.31 As we have 
seen, Schaefer et al. are concerned with the capacity approach to autonomy. Consequently, the 
paradigmatic cases for autonomy inhibition are understood as those phenomena that undermine 
autonomy by inhibiting an individual’s capacities to reason ‘rationally’, ‘properly’ and 
‘soundly’. If we assume that the concept of autonomy merely refers to the capacity for 
autonomy, of which reasoning capacity is a necessary but, on Schaefer et al.’s account, 
insufficient condition, then their argument that CE generally enhances autonomy seems 
plausible. However, as Brian D. Earp, Thomas Douglas and Julian Savulescu observe, on the 
capacity-oriented approach to enhancement, interventions amount to facilitation rather than 
determination of the agent’s behaviour.32 Nevertheless, if we are concerned with whether 
cognitively-enhanced individuals behave more autonomously, then we also need to consider 
the relationships between CE, conditions of authenticity and the exercise of autonomy.  
 Before addressing these relationships in detail (§3), we might gain a better 
understanding of what precisely is at stake by considering some of the ways in which 
Habermas’ autonomy-based critique of enhancement diverges from Schaefer et al.’s response 
to that same critique. The former’s objection to genetic enhancement turns precisely on the 
 
30 Ibid.  
31 Raus, K., Focquaert, F., Schermer, M., Specker, J., & Sterckx, S. (2014). On Defining Moral Enhancement: A 
Clarificatory Taxonomy. Neuroethics. 7(3): 263–73.  
32 Earp, B.D., Douglas, T., & Savulescu, J. (2017). Moral Neuroenhancement. In S. Johnson & K. Rommelfanger, 
The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics (pp. 166-84). New York: Routledge.  
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question of whether genetically-enhanced individuals have the power to govern their own 
actions. Thus, for Habermas, the concept of autonomy does not merely refer to the capacity for 
autonomy. He is concerned with whether a genetically-altered person has ‘authorship of her 
own life’ (in the sense that the reasoning that motivates her actions is authentic) or whether 
there has been an ‘alienating dilution or fracturing’ of her identity that thereby affects her 
ability to (precariously) achieve autonomy.33 Questions of authenticity and an agent’s power 
to govern her actions have also been focal points in the empirical literature on enhancement. 
For instance, commentators on the ethics of Deep Brain Stimulation (‘DBS’) – a neurosurgical 
procedure that employs implanted electrodes to directly alter neural function and behaviour – 
have suggested that this specific form of CE intervention can lead to novel psychological 
characteristics, including reported experiences of self-estrangement and alienation, that 
directly influence reasoning processes that give rise to an individual’s behaviour.34 Whether 
such evidence can be generalised to show that specific cognition-enhancing interventions lead 
to the kinds of self-alienation constitutive of inauthenticity is, however, beyond the scope of 
this paper.35  
 When Schaefer et al. claim that ‘even on the conceptions of autonomy (such as self-
authorship) that critics of enhancement endorse, it is possible to have enhancements that 
promote autonomy and thus avoid their critiques’,36 this claim accounts for only one dimension 
 
33 Habermas op. cit. note 5, p. 82. 
34 Maslen, H., Pugh, J., & Savulescu, J. (2015). The Ethics of Deep Brain Stimulation for the Treatment of 
Anorexia Nervosa. Neuroethics. 8: 215-30; Pugh, J., Pycroft, L., Sandberg, A., et al. (2018). Brainjacking in Deep 
Brain Stimulation and Autonomy. Ethics and Information Technology. 20(3): 219-32.  
35 In terms of the neuroethical literature on self-estrangement following DBS, and the implications for autonomy, 
see, Klaming, L., & Haselager, P. (2010). Did My Brain Implant Make Me Do It? Questions Raised by DBS 
Regarding Psychological Continuity, Responsibility for Action and Mental Competence. Neuroethics. 6: 527–39; 
Gilbert, F. (2013). Deep Brain Stimulation for Treatment Resistant Depression: Postoperative Feelings of Self-
estrangement, Suicide Attempt and Impulsive–aggressive Behaviours. Neuroethics. 6: 473-81; Lipsman, N., & 
Glannon, W. (2013). Brain, Mind and Machine: What are the Implications of Deep Brain Stimulation for 
Perceptions of Personal Identity, Agency and Free Will? Bioethics. 27: 465–70; Gilbert, F. (2015). A Threat to 
Autonomy? The Intrusion of Predictive Brain Implants. AJOB Neuroscience. 6(4): 4-11; Gilbert, F., Viaña, 
J.N.M., & Ineichen, C. (2018). Deflating the “DBS Causes Personality Changes” Bubble. Neuroethics: 1-17; 
Gilbert, F., Cook, M., O'Brien, T., & Illes, J. (2019). Embodiment and Estrangement: Results from a First-in-
human “Intelligent Brain Computer Interface” Trial. Science and Engineering Ethics. 25(1): 83–96. 
36 Schaefer et al. op. cit. note 2, p. 135. 
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of autonomy: competence. On this account, CE improves components of the capacity for 
autonomy, including ‘deductive/logical competence, comprehension (including the avoidance 
of false beliefs), and critical analysis’. According to Julian Savulescu and Rick Momeyer, 
rational belief is a necessary condition of autonomous choice.37 By improving an agent’s 
capacities for ‘deductive/logical competence, comprehension (including the avoidance of false 
beliefs), and critical analysis’, an agent’s ability to reason more rationally is also improved. It 
is in this specific sense that Schaefer et al. consider CE to enhance autonomy. By contrast, 
whether his bioconservative objection is reasonable or not, Habermas is concerned with the 
effects of enhancement on the agent’s power to govern their behaviour. Such a concern is based 
on the fact that he considers the exercise and achievement of autonomy to not be solely 
determined by an agent’s reasoning capacity, but also requires us to consider whether the 
appropriate socio-recognitive conditions obtain such that the reasoning processes that motivate 
the agent’s actions are authentic. The following section will explore Schaefer et al.’s claims 
regarding autonomy inhibition in order to demonstrate the ways in which such claims are 
intimately related to questions of authenticity. By considering their paradigmatic cases of 
autonomy inhibition in light of certain relational conceptions of autonomy, the aim is to 
determine the extent to which CE can be claimed to enhance autonomy.  
 
3. Relational Autonomy as a Challenge to Cognitive Enhancement  
 
Despite Schaefer et al.’s aim to remain neutral between competing conceptions of autonomy, 
there are reasons to suggest that their specific approach to the ‘features common to all (or at 
least most) plausible conceptions of autonomy’ is, in fact, premised on a socially-embedded 
 
37 Savulescu, J., & Momeyer, R. (1997). Should informed consent be based on rational beliefs? Journal of Medical 
Ethics. 23: 282-8. 
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conception of agency. In what follows it will be shown that when it comes to exercising 
autonomy, Schaefer et al. imply that the power behind the reasoning processes that give rise to 
an agent’s actions is dependent not only upon her reasoning capacity, but upon socio-relational 
processes.38 By engaging with the distinctly relational dimension of their approach to 
autonomy inhibition, two authenticity issues will be identified on the basis of which we can 
draw conclusions regarding the limits of CE as a means for enhancing autonomy.  
 The first issue concerns the causally relational dimension of their approach to personal 
autonomy. We noted Schaefer et al.’s claim that accuracy of an agent’s beliefs about the world 
and herself is an important aspect of autonomous choice. They argue that autonomous choice 
‘requires individuals to have sufficiently developed capacities to assess a wide range of topics 
and situations’ and to ‘effectively evaluate the claims of others and recognize fallacious 
arguments’.39 The implication is that whether an agent behaves autonomously depends on 
whether she actually responds formally to those reasons that legitimise or invalidate the mental 
states that move her to act in a particular way, whereby, according to Schaefer et al., these 
reasons are grounded in facts about the agent and external reality.40 As we have seen, Schaefer 
et al. argue that paradigmatic cases of brainwashing, psychological manipulation and deception 
can affect an agent’s autonomy by affecting her internal psychology and inhibiting her ability 
to reason properly.41 Specifically, they suggest that such cases undermine autonomy because 
they prevent an agent from being able to effectively attend to, evaluate and respond to a 
sufficiently broad range of reasons.42 What these paradigmatic cases of autonomy inhibition 
demonstrate is that an agent’s reasoning capacity does not, on its own, guarantee her autonomy 
because the reasoning processes that motivate behaviour can be affected by external forces. In 
 
38 I’d like to thank Julian Savulescu for stating, in response to this paper, that he agrees with this point.  
39 Schaefer et al. op. cit. note 2, p. 126. 
40 Buss and Westlund (op. cit., note 29) observe that reasons are to be understood as external to mental states.  
41 Schaefer et al. op. cit. note 2, p. 127. 
42 Ibid: 126. 
 13 
other words, interpersonal relations can causally contribute to an individual’s power to exercise 
and achieve autonomy.  
External influences can also prevent an agent from responding authentically to those 
reasons that legitimise or invalidate her choices and actions in a number of circumstances that 
cannot be captured by the specific characteristics of cases like brainwashing, psychological 
manipulation, deception and lack of self-awareness. For instance, relational theorists of 
autonomy have argued that internalised oppression and socialisation into overly paternalistic, 
demeaning or unjust interpersonal and social practices can all compromise an agent’s power to 
exercise her autonomy.43 In such cases, including Schaefer et al.’s paradigmatic cases of 
autonomy inhibition, external influences affect an agent’s exercise and achievement of 
autonomy precisely because the causal link between her socio-relational situatedness and her 
competent, authentic self cannot be neatly delineated. In drawing attention to the social 
constitution of the self, such cases demonstrate the ways in which an agent’s personal identity, 
character traits and self-understanding (and thereby her motivating attitudes and reasoning 
processes) are products of motivating social forces over which she has no control in the first 
instance.44 For these reasons, John Christman argues that interpersonal relationships are part 
of the ‘background requirements’ for the exercise and achievement of autonomy.45 
By way of an example that is sympathetic to certain aspects of Schaefer et al.’s 
rationalistic approach, Diana Meyers analyses the process of constituting an authentic self, 
 
43 See, for example, Govier, T. (1993). Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem. Hypatia. 8: 99-120; McLeod, C. 
(2002). Self-Trust and Reproductive Autonomy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Anderson, J., & Honneth, A. (2005). 
Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice. In J. Christman and J. Anderson, Autonomy and the 
challenges to liberalism (pp. 127-49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Benson, P. (2005). Feminist 
Intuitions and the Normative Substance of Autonomy. In J.S. Taylor, Personal Autonomy: New Essays on 
Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy (pp. 124-42). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Mackenzie, C. (2008). Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism. Journal 
of Social Philosophy. 39(4): 512-33. 
44 Kong, C. (2017). Mental Capacity in Relationship: Decision-Making, Dialogue, and Autonomy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 66. 
45 Christman, J. (2004). Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism and the Social Constitution of Selves. 
Philosophical Studies. 117(1/2): 158.  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whereby social forces continuously interact with an agent’s self-conception in the development 
of her capacity for autonomy, that is, those ‘autonomy competencies’ that characterise 
autonomous persons.46 Meyers observes that the authentic agent both recognises and takes 
responsibility for how social forces shape her cognitive and motivational structure,47 which 
presupposes the same aforementioned cognitive capacities for reason.48 However, she also 
recognises that the capacity for reason necessary for the exercise of the authentic self can be 
impaired by oppressive socialisation. Thus, Meyers presents a causally relational account of 
autonomy according to which an agent’s ability to develop the capacity for critical reflection 
that is required for autonomy is contingently dependent upon her interpersonal and social 
relationships. Oppressive relationships may impair an agent’s capacity for autonomy thereby 
calling into question the authenticity of the exercise of her autonomy. By contrast, on the basis 
of a socially-embedded conception of agency, interpersonal and social relationships that 
promote an agent’s skills ‘to engage in self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction’ will, 
according to Meyers, improve her reasoning capacity and thereby contribute to the emergence 
and development of the authentic self.49 
For Meyers, interpersonal and social relationships do not just affect the development of 
an agent’s capacity for reason. She proposes that a certain kind of self-regard is necessary to 
achieve the self-realization required for autonomy competency. Specifically, such self-regard 
manifests as affective attitudes of ‘self-nurturing’, ‘self-worth’ and ‘self-respect’. The point 
being that interpersonal relationships mediate an agent’s self-understanding and, perniciously 
or otherwise, causally affect an agent’s recognitive relations-to-self, including her recognition 
 
46 Meyers, D. (1989). Self, Society, and Personal Choice. New York: Columbia University Press. 
47 Meyers, D. (2000). Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self? Opposites Attract! In C. Mackenzie and N. 
Stoljar, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (pp. 151-80). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 159.  
48 Meyers op. cit. note 46, pp. 83-4.   
49 Meyers, D. (2005). Decentralizing Autonomy: Five Faces of Selfhood. In J. Anderson and J. Christman, 
Autonomy and the Challenges of Liberalism: New Essays (pp. 27–55). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p. 49. 
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of which reasons are relevant to pursuing some ends and not others and the recognition of her 
own character, attitudes, and reflections as worthwhile, meaningful and valuable. It is for this 
reason that, according to Paul Benson, one's authority to speak for one's action-guiding 
commitments depends on having a positive affective attitude towards one’s competence and 
worth.50 If reasoning processes do not reflect an agent’s respect for herself and for her ability 
to set her own ends and evaluate the reasons relevant to pursuing some ends and not others, 
then the power behind the reflective process that gives rise to her behaviour is independent of 
her authority to self-govern. Due to the fact that other agents can prevent someone’s reasoning 
from qualifying as a mode of self-government by preventing the reasoner from developing the 
appropriate self-regarding attitude, relational theorists of autonomy have argued for a basic 
attitude of self-worth as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the exercise and 
achievement of autonomy.51  
In principle, by adopting a reasons-responsive approach to autonomy that requires 
individuals to assess a wide range of reasons and effectively evaluate the claims of others in a 
number of situations, Schaefer et al. imply that autonomy can be impaired when interpersonal 
and social forces influence an agent to such a degree that there is good reason to doubt their 
power to respond to their action-guiding commitments and to attend to the associated reasons. 
Doubts can arise not only because of internal factors such as illness, depression, addiction, 
anxiety and fatigue, but on the basis of external causal factors such as brainwashing, 
internalised oppression, stigmatisation, disrespectful dialogue or inappropriate normative 
expectations resulting from previous encounters with overly paternalistic, demeaning or 
pressurising institutional practices. Whether an agent’s self-regard is nurtured or inhibited is 
ultimately contingent on her relationships. This receptive dimension of constituting the social 
 
50 Benson op. cit. note 43. 
51 Govier op. cit. note 43; McLeod op. cit. note 43; Anderson and Honneth op. cit. note 43; Mackenzie op. cit. 
note 43. 
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agent can also heighten certain inherent vulnerabilities in a dependent relationship. For 
example, as a result of being in an abusive, subservient relationship, an individual may have 
no confidence in the decisions she makes or she may not perceive herself as having the 
authority to make commitments in the first place. In such circumstances, Catriona Mackenzie 
claims that even though the agent has the necessary cognitive capacities to reason properly, the 
exercise of these capacities is compromised such that respecting her decisions and associated 
reasons would not, in fact, be consistent with respecting her autonomy.52 By contrast, exposure 
to ‘relations of care’ that nurture our self-regarding attitudes can, according to Camillia Kong, 
causally contribute to the revision of our perspectives in order to achieve the self-recognitive 
relationship needed to enable ‘a more responsive, confident stance…towards environmental, 
social forces in relation to our personal identity’.53  
Without additional specification, Schaefer et al.’s approach to autonomy inhibition in 
paradigmatic cases paves the way for a conception whereby not only is the development of an 
agent’s reflective and deliberative autonomy competencies causally dependent upon her 
interpersonal and social relationships, but the achievement of autonomy necessarily requires 
an agent to adopt an affective attitude of self-regard, one which is vulnerable to external social 
influences and recognitive relationships. Consequently, brainwashing, psychological 
manipulation and deception are not so much problems we can attribute to the individual being 
brainwashed, manipulated or deceived on the basis of direct and independent cognitive 
limitations. Rather, paradigmatic cases such as these have important epistemic (and thereby 
autonomy-affecting) consequences because they are, primarily, socio-relational problems 
concerned with how individuals relate to themselves in light of interpersonal relationships.54 It 
 
52 Mackenzie op. cit. note 43, pp. 518–9. 
53 Kong op. cit. note 44, p. 85.  
54 For an example of how these paradigmatic cases work in clinical decision-making contexts, see Lewis, J. (2020). 
Getting Obligations Right: Autonomy and Shared Decision Making. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 37(1): 118-
40. 
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follows that although reasoning capacity is a necessary condition for autonomous behaviour, 
the enhancement of this capacity via direct cognitive interventions is, in principle, not a 
sufficient condition for autonomy enhancement. Furthermore, in order to reliably claim that 
CE will generally improve autonomy, we would need to establish the workings of the causal 
systems in which agents are situated, including the internal and external causal factors that 
influence deliberative processes and self-recognitive affective attitudes. Without such 
empirical work, generalisations or predictions regarding the enhancement of an agent’s 
exercise of their autonomy may lead to the glossing over of important complexities and 
deviations from standard cases.  
If we accept a causally relational approach to autonomy, then a second authenticity 
issue emerges on the basis of which we can identify the dimensions of autonomy that can and 
cannot be enhanced. Although, as Schaefer et al. acknowledge, it is reasonable to expect CE to 
generally enhance an agent’s capacity for autonomy, there is a growing body of empirical 
evidence that suggests that CE may not even be a necessary condition for the enhancement of 
an agent’s exercise of her autonomy if her cognitively-enhanced attitudes and reasoning 
processes are not seen as acceptable on the basis of the community’s normative attitudes to 
enhancement.55 The issue here is that the normative attitudes of those to whom the agent relates 
can inhibit her self-regarding affective attitudes necessary for self-governing power if she 
agrees that her cognitively-enhanced capacities are, for instance, unfair, undeserved and/or 
hollow.56 In addition, even if a cognitively-enhanced agent holds the necessary self-regarding 
attitudes, the surrounding community’s normative attitudes to enhancement can affect an 
 
55 Faulmüller, N., Maslen, H., & Santoni de Sio, F. (2013). The Indirect Psychological Costs of Cognitive 
Enhancement. The American Journal of Bioethics. 13: 45–7; Faber, N., Douglas, T., Heise, F., & Hewstone, M. 
(2015). Cognitive Enhancement and Motivation Enhancement: An Empirical Comparison of Intuitive Judgments. 
AJOB Neuroscience. 6(1): 18-20; Faber, N., Häusser, J., & Kerr, N. (2015). Sleep Deprivation Impairs and 
Caffeine Enhances my Performance, But not Always our Performance: How Acting in a Group Can Change the 
Effects of Impairments and Enhancements. Personality and Social Psychology Review. 21(1): 3-28.  
56 Faber, N., Savulescu, J., & Douglas, T. (2016). Why is Cognitive Enhancement Deemed Unacceptable? The 
Role of Fairness, Deservingness, and Hollow Achievements. Frontiers in Psychology. 7(232): 1-12. 
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agent’s power to exercise her autonomy precisely because the exercise of cognitively-enhanced 
capacities and the associated reasons for or against a specific enhancement-derived action are 
considered to be unacceptable in certain circumstances.57 It has been shown that even though 
the effect of CE on an individual’s performance can be increased when the individual is isolated 
from external social influences, both individual and collective performance can be reduced, 
completely eliminated or even reversed when the individual is incorporated within a group.58 
Thus, the effectiveness of CE in improving both individual and group performance depends on 
the psychological processes within the group, which, in turn, are guided by the judgments the 
group members make about CE. Of course, such scenarios ultimately depend upon states of 
affairs, specifically, the public’s attitudes to CE. Nevertheless, research in empirical 
psychology has revealed that the enhancement concerns of laypeople do, by and large, mirror 
those raised in expert normative discussions.59  
 
Conclusion 
 
How should we interpret the claim that cognitive enhancement can enhance autonomy? When 
Schaefer et al. argue that CE can enhance autonomy, their argument is primarily concerned 
with the enhancement of an agent’s capacity for autonomy. If we assume that the concept of 
autonomy merely refers to the capacity for autonomy, of which reasoning capacity is a 
necessary condition, then their argument that CE generally enhances autonomy seems 
plausible. Insofar as it seems plausible that, by enhancing reasoning capacity, the capacity for 
autonomy is generally enhanced, then, following Earp, Douglas and Savulescu’s comments 
 
57 Conrad, E., Humphries, S., & Chatterjee, A. (2019). Attitudes Toward Cognitive Enhancement: The Role of 
Metaphor and Context, AJOB Neuroscience. 10(1): 35-47. 
58 Faber, Häusser & Kerr op. cit. note 55. 
59 Fitz, N., Nadler, R., Manogaran, P., et al. (2013). Public Attitudes Toward Cognitive Enhancement. 
Neuroethics. 72: 173–88; Schelle, K., Faulmüller, N., Caviola, L., & Hewstone, M. (2014). Attitudes Toward 
Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement - A Review. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience. 8: 53.  
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regarding capacity-oriented enhancement, we can reasonably claim that CE facilitates 
autonomy in this specific sense.60 However, the aim of this paper has been to develop a more 
complete understanding of autonomy and its relation to CE. Does CE enhance autonomy, tout 
court? As we have seen, it does not. Given that the exercise and achievement of autonomy is 
not equivalent to a mere cognitive capacity rooted in purely neurological phenomena, there are 
limits to what dimensions of autonomy can be enhanced by direct cognitive interventions.  
  If we are concerned with whether cognitively-enhanced individuals reason and behave 
more autonomously, then we need to consider questions of authenticity. Although this paper 
has not attempted to offer a bioconservative thesis, it has questioned whether CE is, in fact, 
capable of enhancing an agent’s authentic exercise of her capacity for reason. In light of 
Schaefer et al.’s claims regarding autonomy inhibition and the causally relational dimension of 
autonomy that these claims invoke, this paper has demonstrated that the enhancement of 
reasoning capacity via direct cognitive interventions is, in principle, not a sufficient condition 
for autonomy enhancement. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the 
enhancement of reasoning capacity may not even be a necessary condition for the enhancement 
of agent’s exercise of her autonomy.  
The approach taken in this paper complements that taken by Schaefer et al. The upshot 
of both of these approaches is that we must be careful to qualify the claim that CE enhances 
autonomy by specifying which dimensions of autonomy can and cannot, in principle, be 
enhanced via direct cognitive interventions. Without sufficient qualification, promoting CE as 
an autonomy enhancer could not only set unreasonable expectations for would-be consumers, 
it could foster a competitive social environment in which those that either refuse CE, or do not 
have the economic means to pursue it, end up socio-economically disadvantaged (even if CE 
 
60 Earp, Douglas & Savulescu op. cit. note 32. 
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does not, in fact, enhance autonomy).61 What this paper has shown is that CE may facilitate an 
agent’s capacity to be less affected by objects of volition that would otherwise inhibit her 
capacity for autonomy. However, this is not equivalent to affecting the exercise of her 
autonomy; on its own, CE does not determine the ways in which an agent actually responds to 
reasons, her own character and her own attitudes in the ways necessary for genuine self-
governance. 
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